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| CVE-2021-43527, see also [https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2237 here] and [https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/12/this-shouldnt-have-happened.html here].
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Using BigSig where the server cert sig is RSA-PSS results in the remote server throwing {no shared cipher} error when Switch connects. If however one creates a rootCA using BigSig (RSA-PSS), which then signs a server cert where the server key is RSA (not PSS), the vuln can be triggered (if the rootCA is trusted, via using the import service-cmd). It's unknown whether there's other ways to trigger the vuln.
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The crash occurs in VFY_Begin when using the previously overwritten data. A bitsize of <code>$((16384 + 32 + 64 + 64 + 64))</code> is only enough to overwrite cx->hashcx, to fully overwrite cx->hashobj an additional 0xC-bytes (additional 96 bits) is needed.
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Note that partial overwrite isn't an option: this is the func that initializes those fields to begin with, it just does deinit first before initializing hashcx/hashobj (prior to that these fields would be all-zero when not overwritten by the buf-overflow).
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| Heap buffer overflow in [[SSL_services|ssl]], overwriting data including a funcptr.