Difference between revisions of "Cryptosystem"

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−
== BootROM ==
+
= BootROM =
 
The bootrom initializes two keyslots in the hardware engine:
 
The bootrom initializes two keyslots in the hardware engine:
  
Line 48: Line 48:
 
   }
 
   }
 
   
 
   
−
== Falcon coprocessor ==
+
= Falcon coprocessor =
 
The falcon processor (TSEC) generates a special console-unique key (that will be referred to as the "tsec key").
 
The falcon processor (TSEC) generates a special console-unique key (that will be referred to as the "tsec key").
  
 
This is presumably using data stored in fuses that only microcode authenticated by NVidia has access to.
 
This is presumably using data stored in fuses that only microcode authenticated by NVidia has access to.
  
−
== Package1ldr ==
+
= Package1ldr =
−
 
+
== Key table ==
−
=== Key table during package1ldr ===
+
[1.0.0-3.0.2] During package1ldr:
−
 
 
 
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 
|-
 
|-
Line 84: Line 83:
 
|}
 
|}
  
−
=== [1.0.0-3.0.2] Key table after package1ldr ===
+
[1.0.0-3.0.2] After package1ldr:
−
 
 
 
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 
|-
 
|-
Line 107: Line 105:
 
|}
 
|}
  
−
=== [4.0.0]+ Key table after package1ldr (Secure Monitor boot) ===
+
[4.0.0+] After package1ldr (Secure Monitor boot):
−
 
 
 
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 
|-
 
|-
Line 124: Line 121:
 
|-
 
|-
 
| 13
 
| 13
−
| PerConsoleKeyForNewPerConsoleKeyGen
+
| PerConsoleKeyForFirmwareSpecificPerConsoleKeyGen
 
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
 
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
 
| Yes
 
| Yes
Line 130: Line 127:
 
|-
 
|-
 
| 14
 
| 14
−
| StaticKeyForNewPerConsoleKeyGen
+
| StaticKeyForFirmwareSpecificPerConsoleKeyGen
 
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
 
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
 
| No
 
| No
Line 142: Line 139:
 
|}
 
|}
  
−
=== [4.0.0]+ Key table after package1ldr (Secure Monitor runtime) ===
+
[4.0.0+] After package1ldr (Secure Monitor runtime):
−
 
 
 
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 
|-
 
|-
Line 159: Line 155:
 
|-
 
|-
 
| 13
 
| 13
−
| NewPerConsoleKey
+
| FirmwareSpecificPerConsoleKey
 
| Secure Monitor init
 
| Secure Monitor init
 
| Yes
 
| Yes
Line 171: Line 167:
 
|}
 
|}
  
 +
[6.2.0+] After package1ldr/TSEC Payload (Secure Monitor boot):
 +
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 +
|-
 +
! Keyslot
 +
! Name
 +
! Set by
 +
! Per-console
 +
! Per-firmware
 +
|-
 +
| 12
 +
| TsecKey
 +
| [[TSEC#Payload|Package1ldr TSEC Firmware]]
 +
| Yes
 +
| No
 +
|-
 +
| 13
 +
| TsecRootKey
 +
| [[TSEC#Payload|Package1ldr TSEC Firmware]]
 +
| No
 +
| Unknown
 +
|-
 +
| 14
 +
| SecureBootKey
 +
| Bootrom
 +
| Yes
 +
| No
 +
|-
 +
| 15
 +
| SecureStorageKey
 +
| Bootrom
 +
| Yes
 +
| No
 +
|}
  
−
 
+
== Key generation ==
−
=== Key generation ===
 
 
Note: aes_unwrap(wrapped_key, wrap_key) is just another name for a single AES-128 block decryption.
 
Note: aes_unwrap(wrapped_key, wrap_key) is just another name for a single AES-128 block decryption.
  
Line 217: Line 245:
 
.. and on 4.0.0 it was further moved around:
 
.. and on 4.0.0 it was further moved around:
  
−
  old_keyblob_key /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(df206f59.., tsec_key /* slot13 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
 
 
   keyblob_key    /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(wrapped_keyblob_key, tsec_key /* slot13 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
 
   keyblob_key    /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(wrapped_keyblob_key, tsec_key /* slot13 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
 
   cmac_key        /* slot11 */ = aes_unwrap(59c7fb6f.., keyblob_key)
 
   cmac_key        /* slot11 */ = aes_unwrap(59c7fb6f.., keyblob_key)
Line 232: Line 259:
 
   new_per_console_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(0c9109db.., old_keyblob_key)
 
   new_per_console_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(0c9109db.., old_keyblob_key)
 
   per_console_key    /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(4f025f0e.., old_keyblob_key)
 
   per_console_key    /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(4f025f0e.., old_keyblob_key)
 +
 +
.. and on 6.2.0, they moved key generation out of package1ldr, and into the Secure Monitor's boot section:
 +
 +
  clear_keyslots_other_than_12_13_and_14()
 +
 
 +
  old_keyblob_key /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(df206f59.., tsec_key /* slot12 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
 +
  /* Previously, master_kek was stored at keyblob+0x20) */
 +
  master_kek      /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(374b7729.. /* probably firmware specific */, tsec_root_key /* slot13 */)
 +
 
 +
  clear_keyslot(12)
 +
 
 +
  // Final keys:
 +
  new_master_key      /* slot12 */ = aes_unwrap(2dc1f48d.., master_kek)       
 +
  master_key          /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(normalseed_retail, master_kek)
 +
  new_per_console_key /* slot14 */ = aes_unwrap(0c9109db.., old_keyblob_key)
 +
  per_console_key    /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(4f025f0e.., old_keyblob_key)
 +
  
 
SBK and SSK keyslots are cleared after keys have been generated.
 
SBK and SSK keyslots are cleared after keys have been generated.
Line 243: Line 287:
 
This means that if you have an attack on the bootloader, you need to re-preform it every time they move to a new keyblob.
 
This means that if you have an attack on the bootloader, you need to re-preform it every time they move to a new keyblob.
  
−
Dumping the SBK and TSEC key of any single system should be enough to derive all key material on the system.
+
Dumping the SBK and TSEC key of any single system should be enough to derive all key material on the system, prior to 6.2.0.
  
 
The key-derivation is described in more detail [[Package1#Key_generation|here]].
 
The key-derivation is described in more detail [[Package1#Key_generation|here]].
  
−
==== Keyblob ====
+
=== Keyblob ===
 
There are 32 keyblobs written to NAND at factory, with each keyblob encrypted with a console-unique key derived from the console's SBK, the console's tsec key, and a constant specific to each keyblob.
 
There are 32 keyblobs written to NAND at factory, with each keyblob encrypted with a console-unique key derived from the console's SBK, the console's tsec key, and a constant specific to each keyblob.
  
 
Despite being encrypted with console unique keys, though, the decrypted keyblob contents are shared for all consoles.
 
Despite being encrypted with console unique keys, though, the decrypted keyblob contents are shared for all consoles.
  
−
==== Seeds ====
+
Used keyblobs are as follows:
 +
 
 +
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 +
|-
 +
! System version
 +
! Used keyblob
 +
! Used master static key encryption key in keyblob
 +
|-
 +
| 1.0.0-2.3.0
 +
| 1
 +
| 1
 +
|-
 +
| 3.0.0
 +
| 2
 +
| 1
 +
|-
 +
| 3.0.1-3.0.2
 +
| 3
 +
| 1
 +
|-
 +
| 4.0.0-4.1.0
 +
| 4
 +
| 1
 +
|-
 +
| 5.0.0-5.1.0
 +
| 5
 +
| 1
 +
|-
 +
| 6.0.0-6.1.0
 +
| 6
 +
| 1
 +
|}
 +
 
 +
Starting from 6.2.0, key generation no longer uses keyblobs.
 +
 
 +
=== Seeds ===
 
   normalseed_retail = d8a2410a...
 
   normalseed_retail = d8a2410a...
 
    
 
    
Line 272: Line 351:
 
   [4.0.0] wrapped_keyblob_key = 2d1f4880...
 
   [4.0.0] wrapped_keyblob_key = 2d1f4880...
  
−
==== Table of used keyblobs ====
+
=== Versions ===
 +
The key generation system has historically been revised several times. Each version is bound to a specific BCT public key and can be identified by its first byte as follows:
  
 
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
 
|-
 
|-
−
! System version
+
! Version
−
! Used keyblob
+
! BCT public key's first byte
−
! Used master static key encryption key in keyblob
+
! Description
 +
|-
 +
| K1
 +
| 0x11
 +
| Erista prototype development
 +
|-
 +
| K2
 +
| 0xFB
 +
| Erista prototype development
 +
|-
 +
| K3
 +
| 0x4F
 +
| Erista prototype development
 +
|-
 +
| K4
 +
|
 +
| Erista prototype retail
 +
|-
 +
| K5
 +
| 0x37
 +
| Erista development
 +
|-
 +
| K6
 +
| 0xF7
 +
| Erista retail
 
|-
 
|-
−
| 1.0.0-2.3.0
+
| M1
−
| 1
+
| 0x19
−
| 1
+
| Mariko prototype development
 
|-
 
|-
−
| 3.0.0
+
| M2
−
| 2
+
| 0xC3
−
| 1
+
| Mariko development
 
|-
 
|-
−
| 3.0.1-3.0.2
+
| M3
−
| 3
+
| 0xDD
−
| 1
+
| Mariko prototype retail (pre-6.0.0)
 
|-
 
|-
−
| 4.0.0
+
| M4
−
| 4
+
| 0x9B
−
| 1
+
| Mariko retail
 
|}
 
|}
  
−
== Secure Monitor Init ==
+
= Secure Monitor Init =
 
On all versions, the key to decrypt [[Package2]] is generated by decrypting a constant seed with the master key. The key is erased after use.   
 
On all versions, the key to decrypt [[Package2]] is generated by decrypting a constant seed with the master key. The key is erased after use.   
  
−
Additionally, starting from 4.0.0, the Secure Monitor init will decrypt another constant seed successively with a special per console key and a special static key passed by package1loader, to generate a new per-console key. The operation will erase these special keys passed by package1loader.  
+
Additionally, starting from 4.0.0, the Secure Monitor init will decrypt another constant seed successively with a special per console key and a special static key passed by package1loader, to generate the firmware specific per-console key. The operation will erase these special keys passed by package1loader.  
  
−
== Secure Monitor ==
+
= Secure Monitor =
 
The secure monitor performs some runtime cryptographic operations. See [[SMC]] for what operations it provides.
 
The secure monitor performs some runtime cryptographic operations. See [[SMC]] for what operations it provides.

Latest revision as of 22:29, 7 November 2020

BootROM

The bootrom initializes two keyslots in the hardware engine:

  • the SBK (Secure Boot Key) in keyslot 14
  • the SSK (Secure Storage Key) in keyslot 15.

Reads from both of these keyslots are disabled by the bootROM. The SBK is stored in FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY, which are locked to read out only FFs after the bootrom finishes.

SBK is unique per console, and not shared among consoles as originally believed.

The SSK is derived on boot via the SBK, the 32-bit console-unique "Device Key", and hardware information stored in fuses.

Pseudocode for the derivation is as follows: 

 void generateSSK() {
     char keyBuffer[0x10]; // Used to store keydata
     uint hwInfoBuffer[4]; // Used to store info about hardware from fuses
     uint deviceKey = getDeviceKey(); // Reads 32-bit device key from FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY4.
     for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) { // Keybuffer = deviceKey || deviceKey || deviceKey || deviceKey
         ((uint *)keyBuffer)[i] = deviceKey;
     }
     
     encryptWithSBK(keyBuffer); // keyBuffer = AES-ECB(SBK, deviceKey || {...})
     
     // Set up Hardware info buffer
     uint vendor_code = *((uint *)0x7000FA00) & 0x0000000F; // FUSE_VENDOR_CODE
     uint fab_code    = *((uint *)0x7000FA04) & 0x0000003F; // FUSE_FAB_CODE
     uint lot_code_0  = *((uint *)0x7000FA08) & 0xFFFFFFFF; // FUSE_LOT_CODE_0
     uint lot_code_1  = *((uint *)0x7000FA0C) & 0x0FFFFFFF; // FUSE_LOT_CODE_1
     uint wafer_id    = *((uint *)0x7000FA10) & 0x0000003F; // FUSE_WAFER_ID
     uint x_coord     = *((uint *)0x7000FA14) & 0x000001FF; // FUSE_X_COORDINATE
     uint y_coord     = *((uint *)0x7000FA18) & 0x000001FF; // FUSE_Y_COORDINATE
     uint unk_hw_fuse = *((uint *)0x7000FA20) & 0x0000003F; // Unknown cached fuse.
     
     // HARDWARE_INFO_BUFFER = unk_hw_fuse || Y_COORD || X_COORD || WAFER_ID || LOT_CODE || FAB_CODE || VENDOR_ID
     hwInfoBuffer[0] = (lot_code_1 << 30) | (wafer_id << 24) | (x_coord << 15) | (y_coord << 6) | unk_hw_fuse;
     hwInfoBuffer[1] = (lot_code_0 << 26) | (lot_code_1 >> 2);
     hwInfoBuffer[2] = (fab_code << 26) | (lot_code_0 >> 6);
     hwInfoBuffer[3] = vendor_code;
     
     for (int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) { // keyBuffer = XOR(AES-ECB(SBK, deviceKey || {...}), HARDWARE_INFO_BUFFER)
         keyBuffer[i] ^= ((char *)hwInfoBuffer)[i];
     }
     
     encryptWithSBK(keyBuffer); // keyBuffer = AES-ECB(SBK, XOR(AES-ECB(SBK, deviceKey || {...}), HARDWARE_INFO_BUFFER))
     
     setKeyslot(KEYSLOT_SSK, keyBuffer); // SSK = keyBuffer.
 }

Falcon coprocessor

The falcon processor (TSEC) generates a special console-unique key (that will be referred to as the "tsec key").

This is presumably using data stored in fuses that only microcode authenticated by NVidia has access to.

Package1ldr

Key table

[1.0.0-3.0.2] During package1ldr:

Keyslot Name Set by Per-console Per-firmware
11 Package1Key Package1ldr No Yes
14 SecureBootKey Bootrom Yes No
15 SecureStorageKey Bootrom Yes No

[1.0.0-3.0.2] After package1ldr:

Keyslot Name Set by Per-console Per-firmware
12 MasterKey Package1ldr No Yes, on security updates
13 PerConsoleKey Package1ldr Yes No

[4.0.0+] After package1ldr (Secure Monitor boot):

Keyslot Name Set by Per-console Per-firmware
12 MasterKey Package1ldr No Yes, on security updates
13 PerConsoleKeyForFirmwareSpecificPerConsoleKeyGen Package1ldr Yes No
14 StaticKeyForFirmwareSpecificPerConsoleKeyGen Package1ldr No Yes, on security updates
15 PerConsoleKey Package1ldr Yes No

[4.0.0+] After package1ldr (Secure Monitor runtime):

Keyslot Name Set by Per-console Per-firmware
12 MasterKey Package1ldr No Yes, on security updates
13 FirmwareSpecificPerConsoleKey Secure Monitor init Yes Yes, on security updates
15 PerConsoleKey Package1ldr Yes No

[6.2.0+] After package1ldr/TSEC Payload (Secure Monitor boot):

Keyslot Name Set by Per-console Per-firmware
12 TsecKey Package1ldr TSEC Firmware Yes No
13 TsecRootKey Package1ldr TSEC Firmware No Unknown
14 SecureBootKey Bootrom Yes No
15 SecureStorageKey Bootrom Yes No

Key generation

Note: aes_unwrap(wrapped_key, wrap_key) is just another name for a single AES-128 block decryption.

If bit0 of 0x7000FB94 is clear, it will initialize keys like this (probably used for internal development units only): 

 // Final keys:
 package1_key    /* slot11 */ = aes_unwrap(f5b1eadb.., sbk)
 master_key      /* slot12 */ = aes_unwrap(bct->pubkey[0] == 0x11 ? simpleseed_dev0 : simpleseed_dev1, aes_unwrap(5ff9c2d9.., sbk))
 per_console_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(4f025f0e..., aes_unwrap(6e4a9592.., ssk))

[4.0.0+] Above method was removed.

Normal key generation looks like this on 1.0.0/2.0.0: 

 keyblob_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(wrapped_keyblob_key, tsec_key /* slot13 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
 cmac_key    /* slot11 */ = aes_unwrap(59c7fb6f.., keyblob_key)
 
 if aes_cmac(buf=keyblob+0x10, len=0xA0, cmac_key) != keyblob[0:0x10]:
   panic()
 
 aes_ctr_decrypt(buf=keyblob+0x20, len=0x90, iv=keyblob+0x10 key=keyblob_key)
 
 // Final keys:
 package1_key    /* slot11 */ = keyblob[0x80:0x90]
 master_key      /* slot12 */ = aes_unwrap(bct->pubkey[0] == 0x4f ? normalseed_dev : normalseed_retail, keyblob+0x20)
 per_console_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(4f025f0e.., keyblob_key)

.. and on 3.0.0, they moved keyslots around a little to generate the same per-console key as 1.0.0: 

 old_keyblob_key /* slot10 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(df206f59.., tsec_key /* slot13 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
 keyblob_key     /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(wrapped_keyblob_key, tsec_key /* slot13 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
 cmac_key        /* slot11 */ = aes_unwrap(59c7fb6f.., keyblob_key)
 
 if aes_cmac(buf=keyblob+0x10, len=0xA0, cmac_key) != keyblob[0:0x10]:
   panic()
 
 aes_ctr_decrypt(buf=keyblob+0x20, len=0x90, iv=keyblob+0x10 key=keyblob_key)
 
 // Final keys:
 package1_key    /* slot11 */ = keyblob[0x80:0x90]
 master_key      /* slot12 */ = aes_unwrap(bct->pubkey[0] == 0x4f ? normalseed_dev : normalseed_retail, keyblob+0x20)
 per_console_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(4f025f0e.., old_keyblob_key)

.. and on 4.0.0 it was further moved around: 

 keyblob_key     /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(wrapped_keyblob_key, tsec_key /* slot13 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
 cmac_key        /* slot11 */ = aes_unwrap(59c7fb6f.., keyblob_key)
 
 if aes_cmac(buf=keyblob+0x10, len=0xA0, cmac_key) != keyblob[0:0x10]:
   panic()
 
 aes_ctr_decrypt(buf=keyblob+0x20, len=0x90, iv=keyblob+0x10 key=keyblob_key)
 
 // Final keys:
 package1_key        /* slot11 */ = keyblob[0x80:0x90]
 master_key          /* slot12 */ = aes_unwrap(normalseed_retail, keyblob+0x20)
 new_master_key      /* slot14 */ = aes_unwrap(2dc1f48d.., keyblob+0x20)
 new_per_console_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(0c9109db.., old_keyblob_key)
 per_console_key     /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(4f025f0e.., old_keyblob_key)

.. and on 6.2.0, they moved key generation out of package1ldr, and into the Secure Monitor's boot section: 

 clear_keyslots_other_than_12_13_and_14()
 
 old_keyblob_key /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(df206f59.., tsec_key /* slot12 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
 /* Previously, master_kek was stored at keyblob+0x20) */
 master_kek      /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(374b7729.. /* probably firmware specific */, tsec_root_key /* slot13 */) 
 
 clear_keyslot(12)
 
 // Final keys:
 new_master_key      /* slot12 */ = aes_unwrap(2dc1f48d.., master_kek)        
 master_key          /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(normalseed_retail, master_kek) 
 new_per_console_key /* slot14 */ = aes_unwrap(0c9109db.., old_keyblob_key)
 per_console_key     /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(4f025f0e.., old_keyblob_key)


SBK and SSK keyslots are cleared after keys have been generated.

See table above for which keys are console unique.

The key used to verify a keyblob's MAC is not the keyblob key but a key derived from it; this is likely part of an attempt to mitigate side-channel attacks as the MAC is an alterable part of the keyblob.

The bootloader only stores the hardcoded constants for the keyblob used in the current revision. Nintendo are withholding all the future hardcoded constants.

This means that if you have an attack on the bootloader, you need to re-preform it every time they move to a new keyblob.

Dumping the SBK and TSEC key of any single system should be enough to derive all key material on the system, prior to 6.2.0.

The key-derivation is described in more detail here.

Keyblob

There are 32 keyblobs written to NAND at factory, with each keyblob encrypted with a console-unique key derived from the console's SBK, the console's tsec key, and a constant specific to each keyblob.

Despite being encrypted with console unique keys, though, the decrypted keyblob contents are shared for all consoles.

Used keyblobs are as follows:

System version Used keyblob Used master static key encryption key in keyblob
1.0.0-2.3.0 1 1
3.0.0 2 1
3.0.1-3.0.2 3 1
4.0.0-4.1.0 4 1
5.0.0-5.1.0 5 1
6.0.0-6.1.0 6 1

Starting from 6.2.0, key generation no longer uses keyblobs.

Seeds

 normalseed_retail = d8a2410a...
 
 [1.0.0] wrapped_keyblob_key = df206f59...
 [1.0.0] simpleseed_dev0   = aff11423...
 [1.0.0] simpleseed_dev1   = 5e177ee1...
 [1.0.0] normalseed_dev    = 0542a0fd...
 
 [3.0.0] wrapped_keyblob_key = 0c25615d...  
 [3.0.0] simpleseed_dev0   = de00216a...
 [3.0.0] simpleseed_dev1   = 2db7c0a1...
 [3.0.0] normalseed_dev    = 678c5a03...
 
 [3.0.1] wrapped_keyblob_key = 337685ee...  
 [3.0.1] simpleseed_dev0   = e045f5ba...
 [3.0.1] simpleseed_dev1   = 84d92e0d...
 [3.0.1] normalseed_dev    = cd88155b...
 
 [4.0.0] wrapped_keyblob_key = 2d1f4880...

Versions

The key generation system has historically been revised several times. Each version is bound to a specific BCT public key and can be identified by its first byte as follows:

Version BCT public key's first byte Description
K1 0x11 Erista prototype development
K2 0xFB Erista prototype development
K3 0x4F Erista prototype development
K4 Erista prototype retail
K5 0x37 Erista development
K6 0xF7 Erista retail
M1 0x19 Mariko prototype development
M2 0xC3 Mariko development
M3 0xDD Mariko prototype retail (pre-6.0.0)
M4 0x9B Mariko retail

Secure Monitor Init

On all versions, the key to decrypt Package2 is generated by decrypting a constant seed with the master key. The key is erased after use.

Additionally, starting from 4.0.0, the Secure Monitor init will decrypt another constant seed successively with a special per console key and a special static key passed by package1loader, to generate the firmware specific per-console key. The operation will erase these special keys passed by package1loader.

Secure Monitor

The secure monitor performs some runtime cryptographic operations. See SMC for what operations it provides.

Retrieved from "https://switchbrew.org/w/index.php?title=Cryptosystem&oldid=10150"