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Line 1:
Line 1: − == BootROM ==+ Line 8:
Line 8: − + Line 48:
Line 48: − == Falcon coprocessor ==+ − + − + − − The tsec key is the source of all per-console entropy, because SSK is not used on retail. − − == Package1 == − − === Key table during package1 === + + + Line 69:
Line 66: − + Line 76:
Line 73: − + Line 86:
Line 83: − === [1.0.0-3.0.2] Key table after package1 ===+ − Line 98:
Line 94: − + Line 104:
Line 100: − + − === [4.0.0]+ Key table after package1 ===+ − Line 121:
Line 116: − + − + − + − + − + Line 139:
Line 134: − + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + − === Key generation ===+ Line 190:
Line 245: − old_keyblob_key /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(df206f59.., tsec_key /* slot13 */), sbk /* slot14 */) Line 205:
Line 259: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Line 216:
Line 287: − + − + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Line 240:
Line 351: − + + − + − + − + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + − + − + − + − + − + − + − + − | 3+ − | 1+ − + − + − + − + − It is currently unknown what key generation the stage 2 bootloader does.+ + + − == Secure Monitor ==+
→Versions: fix M1-M4
= BootROM =
The bootrom initializes two keyslots in the hardware engine:
The bootrom initializes two keyslots in the hardware engine:
The SBK is stored in [[Fuses#FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY|FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY]], which are locked to read out only FFs after the bootrom finishes.
The SBK is stored in [[Fuses#FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY|FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY]], which are locked to read out only FFs after the bootrom finishes.
SBK should be shared amongst all consoles, but we don't know this is the case.
SBK is '''unique''' per console, and not shared among consoles as originally believed.
The SSK is derived on boot via the SBK, the 32-bit console-unique "Device Key", and hardware information stored in fuses.
The SSK is derived on boot via the SBK, the 32-bit console-unique "Device Key", and hardware information stored in fuses.
}
}
= Falcon coprocessor =
The falcon processor (TSEC) stores a special console-unique key (that will be referred to as the "tsec key").
The falcon processor (TSEC) generates a special console-unique key (that will be referred to as the "tsec key").
This is presumably stored in fuses that only microcode authenticated by NVidia has access to.
This is presumably using data stored in fuses that only microcode authenticated by NVidia has access to.
= Package1ldr =
== Key table ==
[1.0.0-3.0.2] During package1ldr:
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
|-
|-
| 11
| 11
| Package1Key
| Package1Key
| [[Package1]]
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
| No
| No
| Yes
| Yes
| SecureBootKey
| SecureBootKey
| Bootrom
| Bootrom
| No
| Yes
| No
| No
|-
|-
|}
|}
[1.0.0-3.0.2] After package1ldr:
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
|-
|-
| 12
| 12
| MasterKey
| MasterKey
| [[Package1]]
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
| No
| No
| Yes, on security updates
| Yes, on security updates
| 13
| 13
| PerConsoleKey
| PerConsoleKey
| [[Package1]]
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
| Yes
| Yes
| No
| No
|}
|}
[4.0.0+] After package1ldr (Secure Monitor boot):
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
|-
|-
| 12
| 12
| MasterKey
| MasterKey
| [[Package1]]
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
| No
| No
| Yes, on security updates
| Yes, on security updates
|-
|-
| 13
| 13
| PerConsoleKey_40
| PerConsoleKeyForFirmwareSpecificPerConsoleKeyGen
| [[Package1]]
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
| Yes
| Yes
| No
| No
|-
|-
| 14
| 14
| MasterKey_40
| StaticKeyForFirmwareSpecificPerConsoleKeyGen
| [[Package1]]
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
| No
| No
| Yes, on security updates
| Yes, on security updates
| 15
| 15
| PerConsoleKey
| PerConsoleKey
| [[Package1]]
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
| Yes
| Yes
| No
| No
|}
|}
[4.0.0+] After package1ldr (Secure Monitor runtime):
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
|-
! Keyslot
! Name
! Set by
! Per-console
! Per-firmware
|-
| 12
| MasterKey
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
| No
| Yes, on security updates
|-
| 13
| FirmwareSpecificPerConsoleKey
| Secure Monitor init
| Yes
| Yes, on security updates
|-
| 15
| PerConsoleKey
| [[Package1#Package1ldr|Package1ldr]]
| Yes
| No
|}
[6.2.0+] After package1ldr/TSEC Payload (Secure Monitor boot):
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
|-
! Keyslot
! Name
! Set by
! Per-console
! Per-firmware
|-
| 12
| TsecKey
| [[TSEC#Payload|Package1ldr TSEC Firmware]]
| Yes
| No
|-
| 13
| TsecRootKey
| [[TSEC#Payload|Package1ldr TSEC Firmware]]
| No
| Unknown
|-
| 14
| SecureBootKey
| Bootrom
| Yes
| No
|-
| 15
| SecureStorageKey
| Bootrom
| Yes
| No
|}
== Key generation ==
Note: aes_unwrap(wrapped_key, wrap_key) is just another name for a single AES-128 block decryption.
Note: aes_unwrap(wrapped_key, wrap_key) is just another name for a single AES-128 block decryption.
.. and on 4.0.0 it was further moved around:
.. and on 4.0.0 it was further moved around:
keyblob_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(wrapped_keyblob_key, tsec_key /* slot13 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
keyblob_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(wrapped_keyblob_key, tsec_key /* slot13 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
cmac_key /* slot11 */ = aes_unwrap(59c7fb6f.., keyblob_key)
cmac_key /* slot11 */ = aes_unwrap(59c7fb6f.., keyblob_key)
new_per_console_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(0c9109db.., old_keyblob_key)
new_per_console_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(0c9109db.., old_keyblob_key)
per_console_key /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(4f025f0e.., old_keyblob_key)
per_console_key /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(4f025f0e.., old_keyblob_key)
.. and on 6.2.0, they moved key generation out of package1ldr, and into the Secure Monitor's boot section:
clear_keyslots_other_than_12_13_and_14()
old_keyblob_key /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(aes_unwrap(df206f59.., tsec_key /* slot12 */), sbk /* slot14 */)
/* Previously, master_kek was stored at keyblob+0x20) */
master_kek /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(374b7729.. /* probably firmware specific */, tsec_root_key /* slot13 */)
clear_keyslot(12)
// Final keys:
new_master_key /* slot12 */ = aes_unwrap(2dc1f48d.., master_kek)
master_key /* slot13 */ = aes_unwrap(normalseed_retail, master_kek)
new_per_console_key /* slot14 */ = aes_unwrap(0c9109db.., old_keyblob_key)
per_console_key /* slot15 */ = aes_unwrap(4f025f0e.., old_keyblob_key)
SBK and SSK keyslots are cleared after keys have been generated.
SBK and SSK keyslots are cleared after keys have been generated.
This means that if you have an attack on the bootloader, you need to re-preform it every time they move to a new keyblob.
This means that if you have an attack on the bootloader, you need to re-preform it every time they move to a new keyblob.
Dumping the SBK and TSEC key of any single system should be enough to derive all key material on the system.
Dumping the SBK and TSEC key of any single system should be enough to derive all key material on the system, prior to 6.2.0.
The key-derivation is described in more detail [[Package1#Key_generation|here]].
The key-derivation is described in more detail [[Package1#Key_generation|here]].
==== Seeds ====
=== Keyblob ===
There are 32 keyblobs written to NAND at factory, with each keyblob encrypted with a console-unique key derived from the console's SBK, the console's tsec key, and a constant specific to each keyblob.
Despite being encrypted with console unique keys, though, the decrypted keyblob contents are shared for all consoles.
Used keyblobs are as follows:
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
|-
! System version
! Used keyblob
! Used master static key encryption key in keyblob
|-
| 1.0.0-2.3.0
| 1
| 1
|-
| 3.0.0
| 2
| 1
|-
| 3.0.1-3.0.2
| 3
| 1
|-
| 4.0.0-4.1.0
| 4
| 1
|-
| 5.0.0-5.1.0
| 5
| 1
|-
| 6.0.0-6.1.0
| 6
| 1
|}
Starting from 6.2.0, key generation no longer uses keyblobs.
=== Seeds ===
normalseed_retail = d8a2410a...
normalseed_retail = d8a2410a...
[4.0.0] wrapped_keyblob_key = 2d1f4880...
[4.0.0] wrapped_keyblob_key = 2d1f4880...
==== Table of used keyblobs ====
=== Versions ===
The key generation system has historically been revised several times. Each version is bound to a specific BCT public key and can be identified by its first byte as follows:
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
|-
|-
! System version
! Version
! Used keyblob
! BCT public key's first byte
! Used master static key encryption key in keyblob
! Description
|-
| K1
| 0x11
| Erista prototype development
|-
| K2
| 0xFB
| Erista prototype development
|-
| K3
| 0x4F
| Erista prototype development
|-
| K4
|
| Erista prototype retail
|-
| K5
| 0x37
| Erista development
|-
| K6
| 0xF7
| Erista retail
|-
|-
| 1.0.0-2.3.0
| M1
| 1
| 0x19
| 1
| Mariko prototype development
|-
|-
| 3.0.0
| M2
| 2
| 0xC3
| 1
| Mariko development
|-
|-
| 3.0.1-3.0.2
| M3
| 0xDD
| Mariko prototype retail (pre-6.0.0)
|-
|-
| 4.0.0
| M4
| 4
| 0x9B
| 1
| Mariko retail
|}
|}
== Bootloader stage 1 ==
= Secure Monitor Init =
On all versions, the key to decrypt [[Package2]] is generated by decrypting a constant seed with the master key. The key is erased after use.
Additionally, starting from 4.0.0, the Secure Monitor init will decrypt another constant seed successively with a special per console key and a special static key passed by package1loader, to generate the firmware specific per-console key. The operation will erase these special keys passed by package1loader.
= Secure Monitor =
The secure monitor performs some runtime cryptographic operations. See [[SMC]] for what operations it provides.
The secure monitor performs some runtime cryptographic operations. See [[SMC]] for what operations it provides.