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| [[User:hexkyz|hexkyz]], [[User:SciresM|SciresM]] and [[User:qlutoo|qlutoo]]
| [[User:hexkyz|hexkyz]], [[User:SciresM|SciresM]] and [[User:qlutoo|qlutoo]]
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| Weak Security Engine context validation
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| The Tegra X1 supports a "deep sleep" feature, where everything but DRAM and the PMC registers lose their content (and the SoC loses power). Upon awaking, the bootrom re-executes, restoring system state. Among these stored states is the Security Engine's saved state, which uses AES-128-CBC with a random key and all-zeroes IV. However, the bootrom doesn't perform a MAC on this data, and only validates the last block. This allows one to control most of security engine's state upon wakeup, if one has a way to modify the encrypted state buffer.
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| With a way to modify the encrypted state buffer, security engine state control -- dumping of keys from "write-only" keyslots, etc.
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| HAC-001
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| December 2017
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| January 20, 2018
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| [[User:SciresM|SciresM]] and [[User:motezazer|motezazer]]