Difference between revisions of "Switch System Flaws"
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Line 113: | Line 113: | ||
| Prior to [[3.0.1]], the service manager ("sm") built-in system module treats a user as though it has full permissions if the user creates a new "sm:" port session but bypasses [[Services_API#Initialize|initialization]]. | | Prior to [[3.0.1]], the service manager ("sm") built-in system module treats a user as though it has full permissions if the user creates a new "sm:" port session but bypasses [[Services_API#Initialize|initialization]]. | ||
In [[3.0.1]], "sm" returns error code 0x415 if [[Services_API#Initialize|Initialize]] has not been called yet. | In [[3.0.1]], "sm" returns error code 0x415 if [[Services_API#Initialize|Initialize]] has not been called yet. | ||
− | | Acquiring, registering, and unregistering | + | | Acquiring, registering, and unregistering arbitrary services |
| [[3.0.1]] | | [[3.0.1]] | ||
| [[3.0.1]] | | [[3.0.1]] |
Revision as of 15:31, 17 August 2017
System Flaws are used to execute unofficial code (homebrew) on the Nintendo Switch. This page is a list of known and public Switch System Flaws.
List of Switch System Flaws
Hardware
Summary | Description | Fixed with hardware model/revision | Newest hardware model/revision this flaw was checked for | Timeframe this was discovered | Discovered by |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
No public hardware exploits |
System software
Stage 1 Bootloader
Summary | Description | Successful exploitation result | Fixed in system version | Last system version this flaw was checked for | Timeframe this was discovered | Public disclosure timeframe | Discovered by |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Null-dereference in panic() | The Switch's stage 1 bootloader, on panic(), clears the stack and then attempts to clear the Security Engine. However, it does so by dereferencing a pointer to the SE in .bss (initially NULL), and this pointer doesn't get initialized until partway into the bootloader's main() after several functions that might panic() are called. Thus, a panic() caused prior to SE initialization would result in the SE pointer still being NULL when dereferenced. This would cause a data abort, causing the bootloader to clear the stack and then try to clear the security engine...dereferencing NULL again, over and over in a loop.
In 3.0.0, this was fixed by moving the security engine initialization earlier in main(), before the first function that could potentially panic(). |
Infinite clear-the-stack-then-data-abort loop very early in boot, before SBK/other keyslots are cleared. Probably useless for anything more interesting. | 3.0.0 | 3.0.0 | Early July, 2017 | July 30, 2017 | Everyone who diff'd 2.3.0 and 3.0.0 Package1 |
TrustZone
Summary | Description | Successful exploitation result | Fixed in system version | Last system version this flaw was checked for | Timeframe this was discovered | Public disclosure timeframe | Discovered by |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
No public ARM TrustZone exploits |
Kernel
Summary | Description | Successful exploitation result | Fixed in system version | Last system version this flaw was checked for | Timeframe this was discovered | Public disclosure timeframe | Discovered by |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
No public Kernel exploits |
System Modules
Summary | Description | Successful exploitation result | Fixed in system version | Last system version this flaw was checked for | Timeframe this was discovered | Public disclosure timeframe | Discovered by |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Service access control bypass (sm:h, smhax, probably other names) (SM:Initialize() not checked) | Prior to 3.0.1, the service manager ("sm") built-in system module treats a user as though it has full permissions if the user creates a new "sm:" port session but bypasses initialization.
In 3.0.1, "sm" returns error code 0x415 if Initialize has not been called yet. |
Acquiring, registering, and unregistering arbitrary services | 3.0.1 | 3.0.1 | April 2017 | August 17, 2017 | Everyone |
Out-of-bounds array read for BCAT_Content_Container secret-data index | The BCAT_Content_Container secret-data index is not validated at all. This is handled before the RSA-signature(?) is ever used. Since the field is an u8, a total of 0x800-bytes relative to the array start can be accessed.
This is not useful since the string loaded from this array is only involved with key-generation. |
Unknown | 2.0.0 | August 4, 2017 | August 6, 2017 | Shiny Quagsire, Yellows8 (independently) | |
OOB Read in NS system module (pl:utoohax, pl:utonium, maybe other names) | Prior to 3.0.0, pl:u (Shared Font services implemented in the NS sysmodule) service commands 1,2,3 took in a signed 32-bit index and returned that index of an array but did not check that index at all. This allowed for an arbitrary read within a 34-bit range (33-bit signed) from NS .bss. In 3.0.0, sending out of range indexes causes error code 0x60A to be returned. | Dumping full NS .text, .rodata and .data, infoleak, etc | 3.0.0 | 3.0.0 | April 2017 | On exploit's fix in 3.0.0 | qlutoo, Reswitched team (independently) |
Unchecked domain ID in common IPC code | Prior to 2.0.0, object IDs in domain messages are not bounds checked. This out-of-bounds read could be exploited to brute-force ASLR and get PC control in some services that support domain messages. | 2.0.0 |